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THE SUPREME COURT'S LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW JURISPRUDENCE, 1999-2001
David L. Gregory*
INTRODUCEION
The millennium is vested with enormous significance. By definition, the mil-
lennial transition occurs but once every thousand years. The United States Su-
preme Court has been with us for little more than one-fifth of the past millennium,
while labor and employment have been inherent components of the human condi-
tion from the inception of humanity The evolving labor and employment law ju-
risprudence of the United States Supreme Court has been with us from the early
years of the Court. Indeed, Marbury v. Madison,2 the single most famous case in
* David L. Gregory, Professor of Law, St. John's University. gregoryd@stjolns.edu. B.A. cum
laude, 1973, The Catholic University of America; M.B.A., 1977 Wayne State University; J.D. magna
cum laude, 1980, University of Detroit; LL.M., 1982, Yale University; J.S.D., 1987, Yale University. St.
John's law students Neil Dudich, Maura Keating, Jennifer Marciano, and Darren Mogil provided very
helpful research assistance. St. John's provided a faculty summer research grant.
1. For the many Biblical references to work at the beginning of the human condition, in the He-
braic and Christian traditions, see David L. Gregory, Catholic Labor Theory and the Transformation of
Work, 45 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 119 (1988).
2. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137.
3. By any measure, Marbury is the single best known, among lawyers, constitutional law academ-
ics, and judges, of all of the Supreme Court's decisions. For commentary see for example, Dean Al-
fange, Jr., Marbury v. Madison and Original Understandings of Judicial Review: In Defense of Tradi-
1
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the Court's history, in its often overlooked dimensions, was at least indirectly
about employment-about whether Marbury would become employed as a justice
of the peace.
4
The present article is not nearly so millennial and majestic in its aspirations.
It will, rather, critically examine the Court's labor and employment law decisions,
for the recently concluded 1999 Term-a Term which many commentators al-
ready surmise has been among the Court's most significant in several decades.6
The labor and employment law decisions are part of the Court's larger jurispru-
dential fabric which, like Marbury, also at least indirectly implicate issues of em-
ployment. For example, the Court decided that Dr. Carhart, and his like-minded
medical doctor colleagues, could continue to pursue their chosen employment of
performing partial-birth abortions without fear of criminal prosecution. Thus,
from Marbury to Carhart, many of the Court's decisions, while not directly about
labor, have, indeed at least, implicated important questions of labor and employ-
ment.
The 1999 Term's labor and employment decisions can be placed into two
major groups. The most significant bloc involves issues of employment discrimi-
nation law. These decisions range from when a private organization can deny vol-
unteer work opportunity to a person because of sexual preference, 7 to substantial
clarification of the scope of the prevaricating employer's liability for employment
discrimination,8 to the intersectionality of the Eleventh Amendment with federal
employment discrimination law to preclude liability for states which, acting as em-
ployers, violate the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) of
tional Wisdom, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 329 (1993); Akhil Reed Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the Origi-
nal Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 443 (1989); David F. Forte, Marbury's Tra-
vaib Federalist Politics and William Marbury's Appointment as Justice of Peace, 45 CATH. U. L. REv.
349 (1996); Orrin G., Hatch, Modem Marbury Myths, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 891 (1989); James M.
O'Fallon, Marbury, 44 STAN. L. REv. 219 (1992); William W., Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Mar-
bury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L. J. 1 (1969).
4. See id.
5. I will discuss the following 1999 Term decisions under the broadly understood umbrella of labor
and employment law. Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494 (2000); Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 120 S. Ct.
2446 (2000); Christensen v. Harris County, 120 S. Ct. 1655 (2000); Harris Trust v. Salomon Smith
Barney, 120 S. Ct. 2185 (2000); Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S, 62 (2000); Pegram v. Her-
drich, 120 S. Ct. 2143 (2000); Reeves v. Sanderson, 120 S. Ct. 2097 (2000). Although some of these de-
cisions, such as Dale most especially, may not initially appear to be direct labor and employment law
decisions, they do, just as Marbury, implicate labor and employment law themes.
6. See Linda Greenhouse, The Nation: Split Decisions; The Court Rules, America Changes, N.Y.
TIMES, July 2, 2000, Section 4, at. 1; Marcia Coyle, A Small, Potent Docket, NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL,
August 7, 2000, at Al; Donald Falk, Rulings in Business Cases Covered a Broad Range, NATIONAL
LAw JOURNAL, August 7, 2000, at A25. Significant decisions of the October 1999 Term include:
Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000) (parents have the fundamental right to rear their children
and may resist interference from grandparent and others to prevent potential harm to the child); Santa
Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 120 S. Ct. 2266 (2000) (student led prayer prior to football
games is unconstitutional); Dickerson v. United States, 120 S.Ct. 2326 (U.S. 2000) (Miranda rights are
required during custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts); Boy Scouts of America v.
Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000) (Boy Scouts may ban homosexual members if such lifestyle is against the
mission of the Boy Scouts' "expressive association"); Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597 (2000) (Ne-
braska's statute criminalizing "partial birth abortions" violates the Constitution).
7. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000).
8. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 120 S. Ct. 2097 (2000).
[Vol. 36:515
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1967.9 The remaining cases of the 1999 Term span a much more heterogeneous
spectrum, ranging from ERISA pension and benefit law, to severely limiting when
the federal anti-organized crime racketeering law (RICO) can be invoked to con-
test employment termination.
Labor and employment law cases continue to represent somewhat less than
one-fifth of the Court's annual case load, a relatively constant percentage each
year for the past quarter century. In the 1999 Term, however, there was not a sin-
gle labor management relations case per se. Thirty years ago, labor relations cases
compromised three-quarters of the Court's labor and employment law decisions.
The 2000 Term certiorari grants are thus far clustered primarily around themes of
employment discrimination with alternative dispute resolution issues implicating
more conventional labor management relations law. This article will conclude by
offering some preliminary thoughts about possible ramifications from the 1999
Term, and from the pending labor and employment law decisions of the 2000
Term.
I. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
A. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale
On June 28, 2000, the Supreme Court substantially strengthened the First
Amendment associational prerogatives of private employers, and concomitantly
weakened homosexual civil rights initiatives. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for
the Court, gave great deference to the Boy Scouts of America's ("BSA") articula-
tion of its mission as fundamentally antithetical to the inclusion of homosexuals
among its volunteer Scout Leaders.'0 The Court held unconstitutional the applica-
tion of a New Jersey public accommodations law, which presumed to prohibit the
BSA from denying membership and volunteer-employment to individuals based
on their homosexual sexual orientation." The Court's decision was grounded on
the BSA's First Amendment right of expressive association. 12 Dale vitiated the
New Jersey statute, and others like it, which attempted to provide legal recourse
for individuals who were discriminated against in employment and related con-
texts on the basis of their homosexual status, a type of discrimination not directly
prohibited by Title VII.
13
The BSA is a private, non-profit organization that strives to foster confi-
dence, competence, patriotism and morality in boys and young men through a sys-
tem of planned after-school activities such as camping, fishing and outdoor sur-
9. Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000).
10. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. In the aftermath of Dale, several initiatives seek to deprive the BSA of public support, by with-
holding access to public premises and facilities. Kate Zernike, Scouts' Successful Ban on Gays is Fol-
lowed By Loss In Support, N.Y. TIMES August 29, 2000 at Al; Discrimination By The Scouts, N.Y.
TIMfEs, September 3,2000 at WK 10.
2001]
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vival. The BSA is a large, national organization with a long history and tradition
in America which is overseen by volunteer mentor Scout leaders. The BSA, in
fact, is quintessential cultural Americana; what American doesn't know what a
Boy Scout is? Dale, however, is also about what a Boy Scout leader cannot be:
apparently a Boy Scout, and certainly a Boy Scout Leader, cannot be openly ho-
mosexual.
James Dale was a life-long Boy Scout, joining the organization as a Cub
Scout at the age of eight, progressing through its increasingly challenging levels of
honor and merit to attain the coveted, rare honor of Eagle Scout, and remaining
with the BSA as a Scout Leader into adulthood. 4 It was not until Dale entered
college that he realized he was homosexual.15 This realization prompted his in-
volvement with a campus group which offered support and friendship to other
young homosexuals. 6 Dale was interviewed by a local newspaper about the col-
lege support group. 7 After the newspaper article was published, Dale received a
letter from the BSA revoking his membership and, in essence, dismissing him
from his volunteer position as Scout Leader.18 When Dale pressed the BSA for an
explanation, he was informed by letter that the BSA "specifically forbid [s] mem-
bership to homosexuals."' 9
Dale sued the BSA in New Jersey Superior Court, under the state's public
accommodations statute and its common law.20 Summary judgment was granted
in favor of the BSA.21 The New Jersey Superior Court's Appellate Division af-
firmed the dismissal of Dale's common law claim, but rejected the BSA's First
Amendment claims, reversing and remanding.2 This decision was affirmed by the
New Jersey Supreme Court, which cited the large size of the BSA, its inclusive
purpose, its absence of a purely personal, private institutional nature, and the ab-
sence of information suggesting inclusion of Dale would prevent the BSA from
carrying out its various purposes23 The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the
BSA's expressive speech and intimate association arguments.24
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion for the Court, joined by Justices
Scalia, O'Connor, Kennedy and Thomas, ruled in favor of the BSA75 The Court
emphasized the BSA's First Amendment freedom of association, and the correla-
tive freedom not to associate.26 Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that these freedoms
are not absolute, setting out the multi-part test for whether these federal constitu-






20. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2449-50.
21. Id
22. Id
23. Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 160 N.J. 562, 615 (N.J. 1999).
24. Id
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tional rights could be modified by the states: any state regulations must serve
compelling state interests which are unrelated to the suppression of ideas, and
which cannot be achieved through significantly less restrictive means.27
The Court did not apply the three-part Jaycees test.29 Rather, the Court
employed another three part test: whether forced inclusion of Dale as a Scout
Leader would significantly adversely affect the BSA's ability to advocate its insti-
tutional viewpoints; whether Dale's presence as a Scout Leader would signifi-
cantly burden the BSA's desire not to legitimize or promote homosexual conduct;
and, whether the application of New Jersey's public accommodations law runs
afoul of the BSA's First Amendment freedom of expressive association.30 The
Court answered all three questions in the affirmative. 31 Consequently, New Jer-
sey's public accommodations statute as applied was unconstitutional when meas-
ured against this federal constitutional law test32 The Court found that the New
Jersey statute directly affects associational rights.33 Therefore, United States v.
O'Brien,34 which involved a statute prohibiting the burning of draft cards having
an incidental effect on protected symbolic speech, was not relevant here.
The Court took pains to emphasize that its decision was not influenced by
the Justices' individual views as to whether homosexual conduct is morally right or
wrong. Rather, the Court deferred substantially to the BSA's expressed mission:
instilling "morally straight" and "clean" values in male youths.35 The Court ac-
cepted the BSA's characterization of its mission as inherently contrary to includ-
ing homosexuals.36 Essentially, the Court took the BSA's word for it.
The Court also criticized New Jersey's public accommodations law as unduly
broad, inappropriately applying to places which may not necessarily carry an invi-
tation to the public, rather than just to physical places.37 The New Jersey Judici-
ary's expansion, over time, of the statutory meaning of "place of public accommo-
dation" offended the BSA's First Amendment association right not to allow
homosexuals in volunteer BSA employment.
38
Justice Stevens wrote the lengthy and bitter dissent, joined by Justices
Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer.39 Justice Stevens faulted the majority for blind def-
27. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,522 (1984).
28. Id. at 623. The test set forth in Jaycees requires that to justify infringements upon the freedom
of association by the state that: 1) such regulation causing infringment serve a compelling state interest,
2) such regulation be unrelated to the suppression of ideas, and 3) that the compeling state interest
served cannot be achieved through means significanty less restrictive of associational freedoms. See id.
29. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2450-51.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 2452-53.
33. See id.
34. U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).




39. Id. at 2459.
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erence to the BSA's characterization of its mission.40 The dissenters do not be-
lieve that any organized form of opposition to homosexuality is a part of BSA ac-
tivities or mission.
4 1
Justice Stevens pointed to Roberts v. United States Jaycees42 and Board of
Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club43 as precedent compelling the result that
the BSA's exclusionary policy is a violation of Dale's Equal Protection and Due
Process rights.44 It should not be enough, the dissent urged, that the BSA engage
in some kind of expressive activity, or that it has openly adopted a membership
policy which excludes homosexuals, or even that some connection between the
expressive activity and the exclusionary policy has been articulated.4 5 The dissent
urged that the appropriate test, drawn from an amalgam of expressive association
cases, should be whether the mere inclusion of the individual would place a seri-
ous burden, affect in any significant way, or be a substantial restraint upon the or-
ganization's shared, basic goals or its collective efforts to foster particular beliefs. 6
According to the dissent, the BSA could not meet this test. BSA's legal argu-
ments, according to the dissent, were a transparent sham to shield illegal discrimi-
nation.47 There was no evidence whatsoever that Dale had ever attempted to
proselytize or practice homosexuality with the young scouts under his tutelage.
The dissent concluded by noting that notions of homosexuality, morality,
tolerance, and acceptance have evolved, suggesting the law should also evolve.4 9
Justice Souter dissented separately, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, and
reminding Justice Stevens that the First Amendment rights of the BSA remain in-
tact, whether or not they are in keeping with modem notions of homosexuality. 50
Although Dale is a First Amendment case not directly involving a for-profit
employer/employee wage compensation relationship, it has obvious implications
for conventional compensated employment settings. The New Jersey statute re-
pudiated by the Court in Dale states, "All persons shall have the opportunity to
obtain employment.., without discrimination because of... sexual orientation."
51
State protection of this sort attempted to address the federal Title VII lacunae,
since Title VII does not expressly protect individuals who are discriminated
against in employment based on their sexual orientation. Dale repudiated this
state law protection initiative, strengthening the First Amendment BSA associa-
tion right to exclude homosexuals. 2 Of course, not only the public accommoda-
40. Id.
41. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2459.
42. 468 U.S. 609.
43. 481 U.S. 527.






50. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2466.
51. N.J. State.Ann. § 5-4 (West Supp. 2000).
52. Dale, S. Ct. at 2466.
[Vol. 36:515
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tions law of the state of New Jersey is subordinated to the BSA First Amendment
expressive association right; but the public accommodations and, perhaps, human
rights laws of other states are also rendered very tenuous, in so far as they may
presume to protect homosexual association and rights in contested institutional
association and employment contexts.
B. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.
In Reeves 3 the Court clarified that the plaintiff employee can prevail in em-
ployment discrimination litigation by showing that the employer's explanation for
its adverse action against the employee was a lie.54 Even in the absence of con-
crete evidence of discrimination, proof that the employer's explanation for its ad-
verse conduct was not truthful may be sufficient proof of the employment dis-
crimination itself, or can serve as the basis for an inference that discrimination was
the underlying reason for the defendant employer's adverse actions5 Reeves thus
provides plaintiffs with a much more viable evidentiary alternative than the for-
mer requirement that they must have actual proof of the employer's discrimina-
tion. Workers can prevail without overt evidence of the employer's intentional
bias, and the plaintiffs no longer need to produce the proverbial "smoking gun,"
to prove "pretext plus." 56 The Supreme Court thus resolved several important
questions about the sufficiency of evidence in employment discrimination litiga-
tion. Following the McDonnell Douglas5 7 framework, the Court held that the
prima facie case plus sufficient evidence of pretext may permit the trier of fact to
find unlawful discrimination without additional, independent evidence of dis-
crimination.58
Prior to Reeves, the Supreme Court had not squarely addressed whether the
McDonnell Douglas framework, developed to assess claims brought under Title
VII, also applied to ADEA actions.59 The parties did not dispute that the
McDonnell Douglas framework is fully applicable in age discrimination litiga-
tion.6
The employer contended that Reeves was fired due to his failure to maintain
accurate attendance records, while Reeves demonstrated that the employer's ex-
planation was a pretext for unlawful age discrimination.6' Reeves introduced evi-
dence that he accurately recorded the hours and attendance of the employees un-
der his supervision, and that the employer demonstrated age-based animus against
62Reeves. Reeves was deemed by the Supreme Court to have met his burden of
53. Reeves, 120 S. Ct. 2097.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 2109.
57. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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proving a prima facie case of discrimination, by introducing sufficient evidence for
the jury to reject the employer's explanation and to find that the employer inten-
tionally discriminated. 63
In October 1995, Roger Reeves was 57 years old.64 He worked for Sander-
son Plumbing Product, Inc. (SPP) for 40 years.65 SPP is a manufacturer of toilet
seats and covers. Reeves worked in a department known as the "hinge room,"
and he supervised the "regular line."' Joe Oswalt, in his mid-thirties, supervised
the hinge room's "special line."67 Russell Caldwell, age 45, was the manager of the
hinge room, and he supervised both Reeves and Oswalt.6s Reeves' duties included
recording the attendance and hours of workers under his supervision, and review-
ing a weekly report that listed the number of hours worked by each employee.69
During the summer of 1995, Caldwell told the director of manufacturing,
Chesnut, that production in the hinge room was down and that the reason was that
employees were often absent, or coming to work late and leaving early.70 Chesnut
reviewed the monthly attendance reports, but found no problems.7' Thereafter,
he ordered an audit of the hinge room's timesheets for the months of July, August,
and September of 1995.72 At trial, Chesnut testified that the audit revealed many
timekeeping errors and misrepresentations on the part of Caldwell, Reeves, and
Oswalt.73 Following the audit, Chesnut, along with the vice president of human
resources and the vice president of operations, recommended to the president of
the company, Sandra Sanderson (Chesnut's wife) that Reeves and Caldwell be
fired. Sanderson discharged Reeves and Caldwell in October of 1995. 74
Reeves filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Mississippi in June, 1996. 7s He alleged he was fired because of his age, in viola-
tion of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).76 SPP con-
tended it fired Reeves because he failed to keep accurate attendance records.77
Reeves introduced evidence that he accurately recorded the attendance and hours
of the employees under his supervision.78 He also produced evidence showing that
Chesnut had "absolute power" within the company and, additionally, that Chesnut
had demonstrated age-based animosity toward Reeves during their years of work-
ing together, and that Reeves was the subject of age-based pejorative comments
63. Id.
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by the employer's agents.79
On two occasions, the District Court denied SPP's motions for judgment as a
matter of law under Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.80 Under the
court's jury charge, "if the plaintiff fails to prove age was a determinative or moti-
vating factor in the decision to terminate him, then your verdict shall be for the
defendant."8' The jury found for Reeves, determining that SSP's age discrimina-
tion was willful.s2 Accordingly, the District Court entered judgment in the amount
of $70,000, with $35,000 in compensatory damages, and $35,000 in liquidated dam-
ages based on the jury's finding of the employer's willfulness, SPP renewed its
motion for judgment as a matter of law and requested, in the alternative, a new
trial.84 The court denied both motions by SPP, but granted Reeves' motion for
front pay, and awarded him $28,490.80 in front pay for two years of lost income.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that Reeves had
not introduced sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's finding of unlawful dis-
crimination.86 The court reasoned that Chesnut's age-based disparaging com-
ments about Reeves were not made in connection with Reeves' firing, that two of
the people who decided to fire Reeves, including the president, were over age 50,
and that there were several people working in management positions for the com-
pany who were over age 50.87 The court found that Reeves did not introduce suf-
ficient evidence for a rational jury to find he was unlawfully fired because of his
age.88
Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court, reversing the Court of
Appeals. 9 The Court discussed the allocation of the burden of production and the
order for the presentation of proof in discriminatory-treatment cases.90 First, the
plaintiff has to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.9' The Court found
that Reeves satisfied this burden by showing that at the time he was fired, he was a
member of the class protected by the ADEA, in that he was over age 40, he was
qualified for the position of Hinge Room supervisor, SPP fired him, and SPP sub-
sequently hired three people in their thirties to fill Reeves' position.
92
The burden, therefore, shifted to SPP to "produce evidence that Reeves was
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son."93 This, the Court stated, was a burden of production, not of persuasion; it
cannot involve a credibility assessment. 94 The Court found that SPP met the bur-
den by offering evidence sufficient to allow the jury to find that Reeves was fired
because he failed to keep accurate attendance records. 95
The Court pointed out that, although intermediate evidentiary burdens shift
back and forth, the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that SPP inten-
96tionally discriminated remained with Reeves. After SPP offered evidence of its
purportedly nondiscriminatory reason for firing Reeves, Reeves must be given an
opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the reasons offered
by SPP were not true reasons, but were only pretexts for unlawful discrimina-
tion.97
The Court suggested that Reeves made a strong showing that the employer's
reasons for firing him were false.93 Reeves produced evidence that he properly
kept attendance records.99 He also showed that the time clock, which the employ-
ees were supposed to use to clock in, was often broken. 1W SPP's allegation that
Reeves did not report a worker when she was absent was shown to have occurred
while Reeves was in the hospital, and another employee was in charge of supervis-
ing his employees.' 0 '
Reasoning that a plaintiffs prima facie case, in combination with sufficient
evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, allows the con-
clusion that the employer unlawfully discriminated. The Court found the Court of
Appeals erred.1' The Court stated that disbelief of the employer's reasons, along
with the evidence put forth by Reeves in his prima facie case, were adequate to
prove the employer's intentional discrimination.1°3 Reeves, therefore, did not
have to introduce additional, independent evidence of discrimination, beyond the
prima facie evidence already introduced, in order to prove SPP's unlawful dis-
crimination.1°4
As to whether SPP was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the Court
held that the Court of Appeals also erred by finding for SPP105 The Court of Ap-
peals disregarded evidence supporting Reeves' prima facie case and undermining
SPP's nondiscriminatory explanation; failed to draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of Reeves; and, discredited Reeves' evidence that Chesnut was the primary
93. Id.
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discriminatory decision maker of SPP.' °6 Under Federal Rule 50, a court should
render judgment as a matter of law when "a party has been fully heard on an issue
and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for
that party on that issue."'07 By disregarding the crucial evidence, the Court rea-
soned that the Court of Appeals erred in its holding that SPP was entitled to
judgment as a matter of lawy°s
C. Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents
In January, 2000 the Supreme Court effectively eliminated the federal Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA") as a viable cause of action,
where the discriminatory actions are taken by state employers against state em-
ployees. The Court held that ADEA damages against defendant state employers
are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Kimel is thus an important part of a con-
tinuing effort on the part of the Court's conservative Justices to enhance states'
rights.0 9
Although the ADEA originally did not allow for suits for money damages in
federal court against state employers, the Act was amended in 1974 to include
states as defendants, changing the ADEA's definition of "employer" to include
states and their agencies or instrumentalities. 10 There were also amendments to
the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), which expanded the substantive re-
quirements of the ADEA to the states."'
The Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution provides that "the Judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of
another state... It has been interpreted to prohibit citizens of a particular state
from bringing suit in federal court against their home state. There are two ways in
which this strict state constitutional sovereignty may be relieved. First, the state
may consent to be sued, and itself waive its immunity. Congress may also super-
sede a state's sovereign immunity, if two conditions are met."3 First, Congress
106. Reeves, 120 S. Ct. at 2116-17.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Throughout the past decade, many significant decisions have dramatically shifted federalism's
tectonic plates, sparking a Jeffersonian renaissance of states' rights. See for example: Alden v. Maine,
119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999); City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999); Minnesota v. Mille Band of Chip-
pewa Indians, 119 S. Ct. 1187 (1999); New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992); Printz v.
United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997); U.S. v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000); For commentary, see
Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the State: The Use of Federal Law to Free State and Local Officials
From State Legislature's Control 97 MIcH. L. REV. 1201 (1999); Deborah J. Merritt, Three Faces of
Federalism: Finding a Formula for the Future, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1563 (1994); H. Geoffrey Moulton,
Jr., The Quixotic Search for a Judicially Enforceable Federalism, 4 MINN. L. REV. 849 (1999).
110. Kimel, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
111. In Alden v. Maine, the Court found the Eleventh Amendment barred FLSA suits by state em-
ployees agent state government as employees.
112. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XI.
113. Kimel, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
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must unequivocally express that it intends by statute to override state immunity."'
Second, Congress must act pursuant to a valid exercise of its authority to abrogate
immunity."-' In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, the Court determined that
such authority may be derived only from power given to Congress through Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which is the enforcement provision of the Equal
Protection clause. 116
In 1994, 1995 and 1996, three suits were commenced, naming state defen-
dants under the ADEA.1 17 Alabama was named in the first, by a plaintiff who had
been an associate professor at a state university. Florida was named in the latter
two, by employee plaintiffs within the prison and university systems. In all three
cases, the states did not consent to suit, but, rather, defended by asserting that
Congress did not intend to abrogate state sovereign immunity through the ADEA,
and did not have authority to do so, thereby depriving the federal courts of juris-
diction over such state defendants. The district courts were not consistent in their
decisions. Appeals were consolidated in the Eleventh Circuit which held that the
114. Id.
115. See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64 (1985).
116. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
117. Three cases, MacPherson v. University of Montevallo, Civ. Action No. 94-AR-2962-S (ND Ala.,
Sept. 9, 1996); Dickson v. Florida Dept. of Corrections, No. 5:9cv207-RH (ND Fla., Nov. 5, 1996); Ki-
mel v. Florida Board of Regents, No. TCA 95-40194-MMP (ND Fla., May 17,1996) were consolidated.
In MacPherson, two associate professors at the public state University of Montevallo filed suit
against their employer under the ADEA, alleging that the University had discriminated against them
on the basis of their age. The professors were ages 57 and 58 at the time of the alleged discrimination.
Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the University utilized an evaluation system that had a disparate
impact on older faculty members. The plaintiffs were seeking injunctive relief, back pay, promotions
to full professor, and compensatory and punitive damages. The University moved to dismiss on the
basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. They claimed that since the University was an instrumental-
ity of the State, the suit was barred by the Eleventh Amendment immunity. The District Court, finding
that the ADEA did contain a clear statement of Congress' intent to abrogate the State's Eleventh
Amendment immunity, also found, however, that Congress exceeded its constitutional authority under
§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment when extending the ADEA. The district court therefore granted
the University's motion to dismiss.
In Kimel, a group of faculty and librarians formerly employed at Florida State University and
Florida International University brought suit against the Florida Board of Regents. All of the plaintiffs
were over the age of 40. They alleged that the Florida Board of Regents failed to require the two uni-
versities to allocate funds to provide previously agreed upon market adjustments to the salaries of eli-
gible University employees. The plaintiffs claimed that the failure to allocate funds violated the
ADEA because it had a disparate impact on the base pay of employees with a longer record of service,
most of which were older employees. As relief, these plaintiffs sought back pay, liquidated damages,
and permanent salary adjustments. The Florida Board of Regents moved to dismiss on the grounds of
the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity. The District Court denied the motion, stating that the
ADEA contained an expression by Congress of its intent to abrogate the States' immunity, and that
Congress acted within its constitutional authority under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Dickson, Dickson filed suit against his employer, the Florida Department of Corrections in
the District Court for the Northern District of Florida. He claimed that the Department of Corrections
declined to promote him because of his age, and because he had filed grievances with respect to past
acts of age discrimination. Dickson sought injunctive relief, back pay, and compensatory and punitive
damages. The Florida Department of Corrections moved to dismiss the suit on the basis of the State's
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. The District Court denied the motion, for the same reason
as in KimeL
The plaintiffs in MacPherson, along with the State defendants in Kimel and Dickson, appealed
to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The Court of Appeals combined the three cases and
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ADEA did not abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Justice O'Connor wrote the 5-4 decision for the Court in Kimel."8 She be-
gan with the admonition that "the Constitution does not provide for federal juris-
diction over suits against nonconsenting States,"' 9 and proceeded to apply the
Seminole Tribe two part test. She first examined whether Congress unequivocally
expressed its intent to abrogate state immunity. Finding that it had, she then ex-
amined "whether Congress acted pursuant to valid grant of constitutional author-
ity.' 120 She found that it had not.
Justice O'Connor was joined in the first part of her determination by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Stevens, Scalia, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer.
Reading the ADEA as a whole, she found clear intent on the part of Congress to
trump state immunity in the language of ADEA Section 216(b), which explicitly
allows suits against the states by aggrieved individuals, and also in Section 203(x),
which includes states and their agencies in the definition of "employer.' 12' To
these seven Justices, the plain language of the ADEA made Congress' intention
"unmistakably clear."' 22 Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Kennedy, dissented
from this part of the opinion, calling it "a fiction," and expressing doubt as to
whether Congress, in amending provisions of the FLSA, was fully aware of the
implications for the ADEA. Statutory language that was enough for Justice
O'Connor did not persuade Justices Thomas and Kennedy, for whom the defini-
tion sections of the ADEA and the FLSA were not unequivocal Congressional
declarations of intent to abrogate state immunity.1
23
The Court majority considered whether Congress acted within appropriate
constitutional boundaries in drafting the ADEA so as to circumvent states' sover-
eign immunity. The only constitutional authority through which Congress could
abrogate sovereign immunity was Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
is the enforcement mechanism for the Equal Protection clause of Section 1.124
Whether there is a congruence and proportionality between the evil addressed
and the resulting statutory remedy is the test for whether Congress adhered to its
power. The ADEA did not meet this test, according to the Court in Kimel.
Age discrimination, the Supreme Court held, does not violate the Equal Pro-
tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."2 Equal Protection is not violated
because age is not an inherently suspect classification; there is not sufficient his-
torical oppression of older Americans; no apparent political impotence; and, older
people are not a classic discrete and insular minority. Everyone inexorably grows
older. These are important statements by the Court, with ramifications far beyond
the particulars of Kimel and the Eleventh Amendment.
118. Kimel v. Florida Bd. Of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 66 (2000).
119. Id. at 73.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 63.
122. Id. at 62.
123. Id.
124. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 62.
125. Id. at 65-66.
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For these reasons, Justice O'Connor, joined in this part by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, held that the ADEA is not
a valid exercise of Congress' Section 5 enforcement power.126 Congress did not
make detailed findings that any state engaged in widespread, unconstitutional age
discrimination when the amendments to the ADEA purported to abrogate state
immunity. Such findings, if there could in fact be any, perhaps could have saved
the statute from its constitutional infirmity.
Justice Stevens wrote the dissent, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg and
Breyer.127 He expressed distaste for the antiquated doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity, which has its roots in the monarchy of England. Justice Stevens accused the
majority of radical judicial activism, maintaining that it is not the job of the Court
to act as ultimate champion of states' rights.rs
After Kimel, state employees may still invoke the age discrimination in em-
ployment law protections in their particular home state to protect and assert their
rights in the state employer workplace, as Justice O'Connor pointed out at the
close of her opinion for the Court.129 The federal Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990, although it was not mentioned in Kimel, may now be in jeopardy as a
source of federal rights for state employees, on Eleventh Amendment similar
grounds. 3°
126. Id. at 91.
127. Id at 62.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Tennessee Bd. of Resents v. Coger, 154 F.3d 296 (6th Cir. 1998), cert granted, 120 S. Ct. 928
(2000).
Senior faculty members brought age discrimination claims against state university pursuant to
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). In the prior opinion in this case, Coger v. Bd.
of Regents, 154 F.3d 296, the Sixth Circuit had to decide whether states are immune from suits brought
under the ADEA on the basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Court concluded that Congress
intended to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit, by Congress' enactment of
the 1974 amendments to the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq., and that it had the authority to do so pursu-
ant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court based this finding on the Supreme Court's
states' rights federalism decision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, but then vacated and remanded the case in light of, Ki-
mel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631(2000). In Kimel, the Court determined that although the
ADEA does contain a clear statement of Congress' intent to abrogate the states' immunity, the abro-
gation exceeded Congress' authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. After consider-
ing Tennessee in light of Kimel, the Court of Appeals concluded that the faculty members could not
maintain their ADEA suits against the University, a state employer. Accordingly, the prior judgment
was vacated and the district court's order dismissing the plaintiff's ADEA action was affirmed.
In Board of Regents of Univ. of New Mex. v. Migneault, 158 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 1998) cert.
granted, 120 S. Ct. 928 (2000), Joanne Migneault was an employee of the University of New Mexico
from March 1982 through December 1994. She was placed on lay-off status in March 1994, and laid off
in June 1994 after the University decided to eliminate her position as Assistant to the Director of the
Center for Non-Invasive Diagnosis. In March 1994, Migneault applied for the position of Executive
Secretary to the Vice President for Health Sciences at the University, which was two grades lower on
the University personnel scale than her position at the Center for Non-Invasive Diagnosis and which
paid a lower salary. Migneault was over forty years old at all relevant times. She was informed that she
was not offered the job because she was overqualified, and because there was a feeling she would not
be happy in the position. Migneault filed suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) with the Equal Opportunity Commission.
The University claimed that Migneault's suit was barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity and
that Congress did not validly abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity since the ADEA was
[Vol. 36:515
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not enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment under which Congress derives its sole constitu-
tional authority to abrogate. The Court of Appeals concluded that the district court correctly denied
University's motion to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds.
The University's argument was disposed of in light of the Court's opinion in Hurd v. Pittsburg
State University, which stated that Congress validly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by ex-
ercising its authority under the Fourteenth Amendment to enact the ADEA and by indicating its in-
tent to abrogate. 109 F.3d 1540, 1546 (10th Cir. 1997). The Court of Appeals cited a prior opinion
which stated "we are bound by the precedent of prior panels absent en banc reconsideration or a su-
perceding contrary decision by the Supreme Court." See In Re Smith. 10 F.3d 723, 724 (10th Cir.
1993). The Court applied the reasoning of City of Boeme v. Flores, to conclude that Congress had the
constitutional authority to enact the ADEA under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, including the
Equal Protection Clause. See 521 U.S. 507 (1997). The fact that age is not a suspect or quasi-suspect
classification does not mean arbitrary age discrimination is not violative of the Equal Protection
Clause. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,446 (1985).
The Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, has now resolved the split in the circuits, holding that
while "the ADEA does contain a clear statement of Congress' intent to abrogate the states' immunity,
the abrogation exceeded Congress' authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." See Kimel v.
Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 634 (2000). Accordingly, the Court vacated the U.S. Court of
Appeals decision in Migneault, and remanded for further consideration in light of Kimel. After con-
sidering the effect Kimel has on Migneault's suit, the Court of Appeals concluded that she cannot
maintain her action against the University and the decision of the district court to deny the University
Eleventh Amendment immunity was reversed.
Cooper v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 162 F.3d 770 (cert granted Board of Trustees
of Univ. of Conn. v. Davis, 120 S. Ct. 928 (2000)) was brought by Ralph A. Cooper in November, 1993
against the New York State Office of Mental Health (OMH), alleging that OMH's decision to termi-
nate his employment violated the ADEA. Two additional suits were commenced by plaintiffs, all al-
leging violation of the ADEA against their respective employers. The issue on appeal was whether the
federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over claims alleging violations of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621-634 (1994), brought by individuals against state agencies or officials. In all three cases, the dis-
trict courts found that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar claims brought under the ADEA. The
court of appeals affirmed, and appellants were granted certiorari to the United States Supreme Court..
The Eleventh Amendment provides the states with a substantial grant of immunity from suit in
federal court. Congress may abrogate the states' sovereign immunity if it provides a "clear legislative
statement" of its intent to abrogate and legislates pursuant to a valid exercise of its enforcement power
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 537 U.S. 44 (1996).
The Court concluded that Congress satisfied both prongs of the test set forth in Seminole Tribe
by enacting the 1974 amendments to the ADEA. The amendments extended coverage to include state
employees, whereas when originally enacted in 1967, it only applied to private employers. While the
definition of employer was amended, Congress did not alter the ADEA enforcement section. Appel-
lants argued that since the language of § 626(c) remains unaltered, Congress did not express an un-
equivocal intent to abrogate the states' immunity from suit in federal court.
The Court found Congress' intent to abrogate is "unmistakably clear." The Court compared the
ADEA with statutes in other cases. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985); Dell-
muth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989). The Court acknowledged that because the States are exactly
named as an "employer," they fall within the core group of potential defendants in ADEA actions.
The fact that the States are not named again in the enforcement section does not make ambiguous oth-
erwise clear statements of the intent to abrogate.
Further, the court rejects appellants' argument that even if Congress intended to abrogate state
sovereign immunity, it did not have the power to do so because the ADEA was not enacted pursuant §
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. California Public Employees' Retirement System v. Arnett, 179 F.3d
690 (9th Cir. 1999), cert granted 120 S. Ct. 930 (2000), was brought by former police officers, correc-
tional officers and other "safety employees" of the State of California and local agencies. They chal-
lenged the calculation of their disability benefits under the California Public Employees Retirement
System ("PERS"). The Employees were all hired at age 40 or later, and retired from their jobs be-
cause of industrial disabilities.
If two individuals, one 25 and the other 45, were hired as police officers and after a year on the
job were injured in the same accident, according to the California Public Employees' Retirement Law,
Cal. Gov't Code § 21417, the younger employee would receive 50% of final monthly compensation as a
disability benefit, while the older would receive only 20%, due solely to their ages. The Court of Ap-
peals decided that such a plan constituted disparate treatment under the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634, and reversed the district court's grant of motions to
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II. FROM RICO TO ERISA, FLSA, AND THE FAA: THE POTPOURRI
REMAINDER OF THE 1999 TERM
A. Beck v. Prupis
The Supreme Court held that a person terminated from employment will not
thereby usually have a RICO cause of action.131 Congress enacted RICO in 1970
for the purpose of "seek [ing] the eradication of organized crime in the United
States. 132 RICO seeks to eradicate organized crime by providing severe criminal
penalties, and civil actions for any person "injured in business or property by rea-
son of a violation of Section 1962. '133
dismiss for failure to state a claim and for judgment on the pleadings.
Collectively, as the State of California, the California Public Employees' Retirement System and
several other governmental agencies sought certiorari. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and va-
cated and remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit for further consideration in light of its holding in Ki-
mel v. Florida BdL of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000). The Supreme Court held "that the ADEA does
contain a clear statement of Congress' intent to abrogate the States' immunity, but that the abrogation
exceeded Congress' authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." In Illinois State University v.
Varner, 150 F.3d 706 (7th Cir. 1998), cert granted, 120 S. Ct. 928 (2000), the university did not enjoy
Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to both the Equal Pay Act and the Civil Rights Act of
1991. Congress may constitutionally abrogate the States' Eleventh immunity under a particular statute
if it both unequivocally expresses its intent to do so and acts pursuant to a valid exercise of power. See
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 507 (1997). Despite Seminole Tribe, "the Eleventh Amendment
does not insulate the states from suits in federal courts to enforce federal statutes enacted under the
authority of the Fourteenth Amendment." See Goshtaby v. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ill., 141
F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 1998). Although the university raised a number of arguments contending that Con-
gress did not validly abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity when it passed the Equal
Pay Act, the decision of the district court was affirmed.
The court had to determine whether "the Act in question [was] passed pursuant to a constitu-
tional provision granting Congress the power to abrogate." See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59. Two
questions had to be considered: (1) whether Congress, in applying the Equal Pay Act to the States, did
so pursuant to its § 5 powers and, if so, (2) whether the Equal Pay Act is within Congress's § 5 powers,
as interpreted by the Supreme Court in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). The Court com-
pared this statute with the 1974 Amendments to the ADEA, in which Congress acted pursuant to its §
5 enforcement powers when it extended the ADEA's coverage to state and local government employ-
ees. See EEOC v. Elrod, 674 F.2d 601, 608-609 (7th Cir. 1982). The Court concluded that the objec-
tives of the Equal Pay Act were within Congress' powers under the Fourteenth Amendment, since
prohibiting arbitrary discriminatory government conduct (sex-based wage disparities), is the very es-
sence of the guarantee of 'equal protection of the laws' of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court determined that the legislation was appropriate under Congress's enforcement
power. See City of Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2163. The Court did not find that Congress's scope is out of
proportion to the harms it sought to redress. See Goshtasby, 141 F.3d at 772.
In order to establish a claim under the Equal Pay Act, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the em-
ployer pays different wages to employees of the opposite sex "for equal work on jobs the performance
of which requires equal skill, effort and responsibility, and which are performed under equal working
conditions." 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). Liability is not automatically established, however. Employers may
assert one of three affirmative defenses explaining the wage differential: a seniority system, a merit
system or a system that measures wages by quantity or quality of production. An employer may also
avoid liability when the differential is "based on any other factor other than sex." Id. at §
206(d)(1)(iv).
In light of the above, the Court concluded that Congress validly abrogated the University's
Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit under the Equal Pay Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
which merely creates an additional remedy for claims brought under Title VII rather than create a dis-
tinct cause of action.
131. See Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494,499 (2000).
132. Id. at 496.
133. Id. at 494.
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Robert Beck is a former president, CEO, director, and shareholder of
Southeastern Insurance Group (SIG).134 The respondents, Ronald Prupis, Leo-
nard Bellezza, William Paulus, Jr., Ernest S. Sabato, Harry Olstein, Frederick C.
Mezey, and Joseph S. Littenberg, are former senior officers and directors of
SIG.' 35 SIG declared bankruptcy in 1990.136 Until this time, SIG had been an in-
surance company with three subsidiaries, each of which was involved in the busi-
ness of writing surety bonds for construction contractors.1 37
A number of directors from SIG, including the respondents, began engaging
in acts of racketeering in 1987.35 The respondents created a corporation, Con-
struction Performance Corporation, which demanded fees from contractors in ex-
change for qualifying them for surety bonds. 139 The respondents also diverted
corporate funds for personal use, and submitted false financial statements to regu-
lators, shareholders, and creditors. Beck was unaware of the racketeering activi-
ties until 1988.'4° Upon his discovery of the illegal activities, Beck contacted regu-
lators regarding the company's false statements. 41 At this point, the respondents
devised a plan in which they would terminate Beck's employment. 42 The respon-
dents had an insurance consultant write a false report, suggesting that Beck had
not performed his duties for SIG.'43 The report was given to the SIG board of di-
rectors. The next day, the board dismissed Beck, pursuant to a clause in his em-
ployment contract stating that Beck could be fired for an "inability or a substantial
failure to perform [his] material duties."'144
Beck sued the respondents in, inter alia, a civil RICO cause of action. 45
Beck claimed that the respondents used income derived from a pattern of racket-
eering activity to establish an enterprise, in violation of RICO § 1962(a); acquired
and maintained an interest in their enterprise through racketeering activities, vio-
lating § 1962(b); engaged in the conduct of the enterprise's affairs through a pat-
tern of racketeering activities, in violation of § 1962(c); and conspired to commit
acts in violation of § 1962(d). With respect to the final claim, Beck asserted that
his injury was proximately caused by an overt act-his termination of his employ-
ment-which was done in the furtherance of the respondents' conspiracy and,
therefore, that RICO § 1964(c) provided a cause of action.146
The respondents filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that an em-
ployee terminated for failure to participate in RICO activities, or who threatens
134. Id. at 497.
135. Id. at 497-98.
136. Id.






143. Beck, 529 U.S. at 498.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 498.
146. Id. at 498-99.
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to report RICO activities, does not have standing to sue for the termination of his
employment. 47 The District Court granted the motion for summary judgment,
and dismissed Beck's RICO conspiracy claim. 14s
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court's
judgment holding that a RICO cause of action under § 1964(c) for a violation of §
1962(d) is not available to a person who is injured by an overt act in furtherance of
a RICO conspiracy, unless the act itself-i.e., the termination from employment-
is an act of racketeering. 49 Since SIG's firing of Beck was not an act of racketeer-
ing, the Court of Appeals held Beck did not have a civil RICO claim.150
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justice
Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Souter joined.15' The Court
granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeal with respect to
the question of whether a person injured by an overt act in furtherance of a con-
spiracy may assert a civil RICO conspiracy claim under § 1964(c) for a violation of
§1962(d), even if the overt act -such as the discharge from employment-does
not constitute "racketeering activity."152 The majority of courts that considered
the question answered it in the negative. 5 3
RICO § 1964(c) states that a cause of action is available to anyone "in-
jured... by reason of a violation of §1962."' ' 4 Section 1962(d) makes it unlawful
for a person "to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or
(c) of this section." 155 The Court then turned to what it means to be "injured ...
by reason of a 'conspiracy.'
15 6
First, the Court looked at the "well established common law of civil conspir-
acy.' 57 The Court pointed to Morissette v. United States,' where the Court said
that when Congress uses language with a settled meaning at common law, Con-
gress "presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to
each borrowed word.., and the meaning that its use will convey to the judicial
mind.', 15 9 When RICO was enacted in 1970, it was widely accepted that a plaintiff








153. The Courts of Appeal for the First, Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. The Courts of Appeal
for the Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits had allowed RICO conspiracy claims where the overt act was
the termination of employment (as is the situation in the current case), and not racketeering activity.
154. See Beck, 529 U.S. at 498.
155. See id.
156. See id& at 500.
157. See id.
158. 342 U.S. 246,263 (1952).
159. Beck, 529 U.S. at 501.
160. Id. (Citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 comment b (1977)).
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The Court held that a conspiracy claim was not an independent cause of ac-
tion, but only a mechanism for subjecting co-conspirators to liability when one of
their members committed a tort.161 The principle that a civil conspiracy plaintiff
must claim injury from an act of tort was so widely accepted at the time that RICO
was enacted that it was incorporated in the common understanding of "civil con-
spiracy." 162 The Court said, in light of the meaning that was attached to the term
"civil conspiracy" at the time of RICO's enactment, Congress established a civil
cause of action in RICO intended for a person who had suffered legal damage
from a tortious act. 63 Interpreting RICO in light of the common law meaning, the
Court concluded that an injury caused by an overt act that is not itself an act of
racketeering or otherwise wrongful under RICO is not sufficient to give rise to a
RICO cause of action under § 1964(c) for a violation of § 1962(d).
64
In this decision for the 7-2 majority, Justice Thomas summarized: "As at
common law, a civil conspiracy plaintiff cannot bring suit under RICO based on
an injury caused by any act of furtherance of a conspiracy that might have caused
the plaintiff injury."165 Rather, consistency with the common law requires that a
RICO conspiracy plaintiff allege injury from an act that is analogous to an act of
tortious character... meaning an act that is independently wrongful under
RICO.""1
Justice Stevens, in dissent, argued that the plain language of RICO made it
clear that Beck had a viable RICO cause of action under § 1964(c), because he al-
leged an injury which was caused by an overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy
that violated § 1962(d).' 67
B. Pegram, et al. v. Herdrich
The Court unanimously ruled that treatment decisions made by a health
maintenance organization, acting through its physician employees, are not fiduci-
ary acts within the meaning of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA).16' Therefore, disappointed patients cannot use federal ERISA law
to sue HMOs for providing financial incentives to HMO physician employees who
reduce HMO patient treatment costs.
Carle Clinic Association, P.C., Health Alliance Medical Plans, Inc., and
Carle Health Insurance Management Co., Inc. (collectively known as Carle) act as
a health maintenance organization (HMO) organized for profit. 69 The HMO is
161. Id. at 501.
162. Id. (Citing Ballentine's Law Dictionary 252 (3d ed. 1969) ("it is the civil wrong resulting in
damage, and not the conspiracy which constitutes the cause of action"); Black's Law Dictionary 383
(4th ed. 1968) ([w]here, "in carrying out the design of the conspirators, overt acts are done causingle-
gal damage, the person injured has a right of action")).
163. 1d at 503.
164. Id. at 506.
165. Beck, 529 U.S. at 494.
166. Id. at 494.
167. Id.
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owned by a group of physicians who provide medical services to participants
whose employers contract with Carle to provide such coverage.70 Cynthia Her-
drich was covered by Carle through her husband's employer, State Farm Insur-
ance Company.
171
Lori Pegram is a Carle physician.' Dr. Pegram examined Herdrich, who
was experiencing pain in the midline area of her groin.1 Six days later, Dr. Pe-
gram discovered a six by eight centimeter inflamed mass in Herdrich's abdomen.1 74
Dr. Pegram did not order an ultrasound diagnostic procedure at a local hospital,
but decided that Herdrich would have to wait eight days for an ultrasound to be
performed at a facility staffed by Carle physicians more than 50 miles away.175 Be-
fore the time for Herdrich's ultrasound arrived, her appendix ruptured, causing
peritonitis.176
Herdrich sued Dr. Pegram and Carle in state court for medical malpractice
and state-law fraud. 77 Carle and Pegram responded that ERISA preempted the
state-law counts, and removed the case to federal court. 178 They then sought
summary judgment on the state-law counts. 79 The District Court granted the mo-
tion as to one count, but granted Herdrich leave to amend the other count.'O She
did so by alleging that provision of medical services under the terms of the Carle
HMO, which reward physician owners for limiting medical care, entailed an in-
herent or anticipatory breach of an ERISA fiduciary duty, since these terms cre-
ated an incentive to make decisions in the physicians' self-interest, rather than the
exclusive interests of the plan participants.
The District Court granted the motion by Carle and Pegram to dismiss the
ERISA count for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, find-
ing that Carle was not an ERISA fiduciary.l8 The malpractice claim was tried,
and a jury awarded Herdrich $35,000 in compensation for her injuries. 83 Herdrich
appealed the dismissal of the ERISA claim. The Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit reversed the District Court, holding that Carle was acting as a fiduci-
ary when its physicians made the challenged decisions.184 They stated that "incen-
tives can rise to the level of a breach where, as pleaded here, the fiduciary trust
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181. Id.





Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 36 [2000], Iss. 3, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol36/iss3/1
SUPREME COURT'S LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
cians delay providing necessary treatment to, or withhold administering proper
care to, plan beneficiaries for the sole purpose of increasing their bonuses)."'1 5
Justice Souter delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court.186 The Court
first described the nature of the HMO.' s HMOs receive a fixed fee from each pa-
tient enrolled, and agree to provide patients with specified health needed care.188
HMOs take steps to control costs, including financial rewards to physicians who
decrease the utilization of health care services, and financial penalties to physi-
cians who perform excessive treatment.8 9 Herdrich argued that Carle's plan was
different from a H1MO, and would not open the floodgates if the Court allowed
suits against HMOs; Carle's incentive scheme was to pay each physician annually
the profit resulting from their individual patient treatment decisions.' 9° The Court
rejected this plaintiff argument, finding that this financial arrangement system is
the very principle at the heart of HMOs.' 91
The Court opined that the judiciary is not in a position to draw a bright line
between what constitutes a good or bad HMO.' 92 What constitutes a socially ac-
ceptable medical risk should be left to the legislature.' 9' Since courts cannot dif-
ferentiate between an organization such as Carle and other HMOs, the Court as-
sumed that the challenged HMO decisions here cannot be subject to a claim under
ERISA fiduciary standards, unless all such decisions by all HMOs acting through
their physicians are judged by the same standards and subject to the same
claims.' 94
An ERISA fiduciary is someone acting in the capacity of manager, adminis-
trator, or financial adviser to a "plan."'195 The ERISA "plan" in this case was the
set of rules in the agreement with the HMO, defining the rights of the beneficiary,
and providing for enforcement. ERISA states that fiduciaries shall discharge
their duties with respect to a plan 'solely in the interest of the participants and
beneficiaries."' 97 If an ERISA fiduciary has financial interests adverse to benefici-
aries, the question in alleged breach of ERISA fiduciary duty is whether the per-
son who made the decision was performing a fiduciary function when taking the
challenged action. 93
Herdrich's claim was that Carle was a fiduciary, acting through its physicians,
185. Id.
186. Pegram, 120 S. Ct. at 2146.
187. Id. at 2149.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 2150.
191. Id.
192. Pegram, 120 S. Ct. at 2150.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 2150-51.
195. Id. at 2151.
196. Id.
197. 29 U.S.C. 1104(a)(1).
198. Pegram, 120 S. Ct. at 2152-53.
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because Carle contracted with State Farm to provide coverage! 9" Carle allegedly
breached its fiduciary duty by making a decision that would affect the health of a
beneficiary, while influenced by the compensation incentives for doctors who util-
ize less treatment.2m
The Court found that Congress did not intend an HMO to be treated as a fi-
duciary to the extent that the HMO makes decisions that are mixed eligibility and
treatment decisions that rely on medical judgments in order to make plan cover-
age determinations.2°1 The Court compared the ERISA fiduciary to the fiduciary
of common law trusts; since the common law trustee's main objective is the pay-
ment of money in the beneficiary's interest, and mixed eligibility decisions have
only limited resemblance to that concern, Congress' intent is very clear. 2° The
Court reasoned that if Herdrich prevailed, a plaintiff could recover against a for-
profit HMO for mixed eligibility decisions simply by showing that the profit incen-
tive to ration care would generally affect such decisions, in derogation of the fidu-
ciary standard to act in the patient's interest without possibility of conflict. 203 They
stated in pertinent part:
Granting the remedy would eliminate for-profit HMOs. The Court then said that it
is not the judiciary's place to precipitate the upheaval that would occur in the HMO
industry if Herdrich's claim were permitted. The Court said that such decisions are
best left to the legislative branch.2"4
The Court also opined that if Herdrich's claim was entertained, then, for all
practical purposes, all fiduciary claims would boil down to a malpractice claim,
and the ERISA fiduciary standard would be nothing more than the traditional
medical malpractice standard.205 The only thing that would be of value to plan par-
ticipants who brought an ERISA fiduciary action would be recovery of attorney's
fees.206
Justice Souter summarized:
The fact is that for over 27 years the Congress of the United States has promoted
the formation of HMO practices... the federal judiciary would be acting contrary
to the congressional policy ... if it were to entertain [a claim] portending wholesale
attacks on existing HMOs solely because of their structure."207 Any other ruling
"would be nothing less than elimination of the for-profit HMO. 20
C. Harris Trust and Savings Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney
The Supreme Court unanimously decided that a suit to assert the fiduciary
199. Id. at 2153.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 2155.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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rights of an employee benefit plan pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) may be brought against not only that fiduciary, but
also against a non fiduciary party in interest.2w Consequently, employee benefit
plans can sue brokers and others who provide services for losing money.21 0 The
Court looked at ERISA as a whole, and at the common law of trusts, in making its
determination.
Ameritech Pension Trust ("APT") is an ERISA pension plan that provides
benefits to employees and retirees of Ameritech Corporation. Salomon Smith
Barney ("Salomon") is a brokerage firm.2 ' During the 1980s, Salomon performed
equity trades for the fiduciary of APT and became a "party in interest" as defined
212by ERISA. While these brokering service were being performed, Salomon also
sold APT interests in several motels. This sale was orchestrated by National In-
vestment Services of America, an investment manager hired by APT to act as fi-
duciary for the benefit funds. The cost of the interests was $21 million.
213
Harris Trust and Savings Bank ("Harris") later found out that the motel in-
terests Salomon brokered for APT were virtually worthless.1 4 As a fiduciary of
APT, Harris sued Salomon alleging a violation of § 406 (a) (1) of ERISA, which
prohibits transactions likely to injure the pension plan. Harris sought rescission of
the transaction, restitution of the purchase price, and disgorgement of profits
made by Salomon from their use of plan assets.
215
The district court denied Salomon's motion for summary judgment, rejecting
its argument that § 503(a)(3) of ERISA, under which Harris was suing, only au-
thorized suit against the fiduciary which actually harmed the benefit plan.
216
The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court, holding that a non-fiduciary
cannot, in fact, be liable under ERISA § 503(a)(3) for participating in a transac-
tion made illegal by § 406.217 Summary judgment was entered in favor of Salomon.
Because the Seventh Circuit differed in its result from other Courts of Appeals,
certiorari was granted.218
Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, pointed out that § 502 places no limits
on the number or type of possible defendants, save for the rule that "appropriate
equitable relief' must be sought.219 This omission contrasted with other ERISA
209. Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Salomon Smith & Barney, 120 S. Ct. 2180 (2000).
210. Id.
211. Id- at 2185.
212. 29 U.S.C. §1002(14)(b)(1004)(quoting Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Salomon Smith &
Barney, 120 S. Ct. 2180 (2000), defining "party in interest" as "a person providing services to an em-
ployee benefit plan").
213. Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 120 S. Ct. at 2185.
214. Id.
215. 1& (Citing to § 406 (a)(1)(A) prohibits a "sale or exchange of any property between the plan
and a party in interest." § 406(a)(1)(D) prohibits a transfer to a party in interest of any assets of the
plan").
216. Id. at 2186.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 120 S. Ct. at 2187.
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provisions, which do specify who may be a defendant.2°
The remedial portion of ERISA, § 502 (e), provides that, "any knowing par-
ticipation in a breach of fiduciary duty by "any other person" than a fiduciary,
gives rise to the assessment of a civil penalty."2 1 The Court reasoned that if the
Secretary may file suit against an "other person," then a participant, beneficiary or
fiduciary of an ERISA benefit plan must be able to do the same.2 Section 502(e)
makes it clear that liability under § 503(a)(3) is not limited to that which is ex-
pressly imposed by the substantive portions of ERISA.2
Justice Thomas examined the common law of trusts, upon which analysis of
ERISA depends in the first instance, and which allows for equitable relief against
a non-fiduciary party in interest.224 He offered the example of a property transac-
tion where the property was fraudulently obtained; the fact that the transferee was
not the perpetrator of the fraud would not shield that transferee from liability in
restitution. Here, the relief sought by Harris was equitable in nature, neither
ERISA nor the common law of trusts prevented Harris from seeking such a rem-
edy against Salomon, a non-fiduciary party in interest!
26
The Court dismissed Salomon's argument that weight should be given to the
fact that a Congressional committee rejected language that would have specifically
named non-fiduciary parties in interest as possible defendants. 227 Instead, the
Court opted to allow only the language of the statute itself to enter into the analy-
sis.ru It also rejected the argument that to allow suit against non-fiduciary parties
in interest is against public policy because of the increased cost of doing business
with entities in such a vulnerable position, for the same reason: plain language.229
The Seventh Circuit decision was therefore reversed, allowing Harris to proceed
against Salomon as to whether Salomon had violated Erisa § 406(a).230
D. Christensen v. Harris County
In Christensen, the Court held that public sector employees may be com-
pelled to accept compensatory time off, in lieu of premium wage compensation,
for overtime work.231 State and local governmental employers can dictate to their
employees when the employees must take off compensatory time, which the em-
ployees previously agreed to bank in lieu of paid compensation for overtime hours
worked, absent any collective bargaining agreement express provision other-
220. Id.




225. Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 120 S. Ct. at 2189. (See also Moore v. Crawford, 32 LED. 878
(1989) (quoting J. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 1053, pp. 628-29 (1986)).
226. Id. at 2190.
227. Id. at 2191.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 2190.
230. Id.
231. Christiansen v. Harris County, 20 S. Ct. 1655,1657 (2000).
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Wie232wise. z
In Christensen, the petitioners were 127 deputy sheriffs, and the sheriff, of
Harris County, Texas. 33 All of these employees of Harris County agreed to ac-
cept compensatory time, instead of cash, as compensation for overtime.2 4 Harris
County became concerned that it lacked the resources to pay monetary compensa-
tion to employees who worked overtime, after reaching the statutory limit on
compensatory time accrual, and to employees who left their jobs with a large
amount of accumulated compensatory time. 35 Consequently, Harris County
sought a method to reduce the amount of compensatory time that employees
could accumulate.
Harris County inquired of the United States Department of Labor's Wage
and Hour Division about the feasibility of a plan whereby the county sheriff would
be able to schedule employees to use their compensatory time. 6 The Acting Ad-
ministrator of the Division replied that it was the Labor Department's position
that Harris County could not schedule its employees to use their accrued compen-
satory time, unless there was a prior agreement between the employer and em-
ployee allowing such an action. 7
Despite the negative advice in the opinion letter issued by the Department
of Labor, Harris County implemented a policy whereby the employees' supervisor
would set a maximum amount of compensatory hours that an employee could ac-
cumulate.238 As the employee reached the limit, the employee would be alerted
and asked to take steps to reduce accumulated time.239 If the employee did not
reduce compensatory time, a supervisor would order the employee to use the time
at a specified time.240
The employees claimed that Harris County's policy violated the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA).241 The alleged violation lies in the fact that
§207(o)(5) of the FLSA requires an employer reasonably to accommodate em-
ployee requests to use compensatory time.242 The employees claimed that this was
the exclusive means for utilizing accrued compensatory time, in the absence of an
agreement to another method.243
The District Court for the Southern District of Texas agreed with the em-
ployees. The court granted them summary judgment, and entered a declaratory
judgment that the County's policy violated the FLSA.2 4 The Court of Appeals for









241. Id. (Citing to 29 U.S.C. § 207(o)(5) (1991).
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the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the FLSA did not prohibit the County
from implementing its compensatory time policy.24
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter; Justice Scalia joined in
part. Justice Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented. The FLSA provides that
employees who are paid by the hour and who work more than 40 hours per week
be compensated for excess hours at a rate of not less than 1.5 times their regular
wage.246 The FLSA encompasses public employers, such as Harris County.
Through amendments to the FLSA, the State, and the political subdivisions of the
State, may compensate employees for the overtime that they work by granting
them compensatory time at a rate of 1.5 hours for every 1 hour of overtime
247
worked . In order to give compensatory time to an employee, there must be an
agreement between the employer and employee evidencing the fact that the em-
ployee understands that compensatory time will be granted in lieu of cash com-
pensation.m
The FLSA puts a cap on the compensatory hours that an employee may ac-
cumulate and after the employee reaches this cap, the employer must pay cash
compensation for additional hours of overtime worked.249 The FLSA also allows
an employer to "cash out" an employee's accumulated compensatory time hours
by paying the employee for unused compensatory time. ° The FLSA further pro-
vides that an employer must honor an employee's request to use compensatory
time within a "reasonable time" of the request, unless the requested use would
"unduly disrupt" the employer's operations.2 It is this provision of the FLSA
that the employees relied on in support of their claim.
The employees maintained that the express grant of control to employees to
use compensatory time implies that all other methods of using compensatory time
are precluded, relying on the canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius'~2 The
Court found their argument unpersuasive, however, and that the FLSA merely
forbids an employer from denying an employee's request to use compensatory
time, unless such request would unduly disrupt the employer's business; the FLSA
does not forbid an employer from telling an employee when to use accumulated
compensatory time.
The Court reasoned that the cap that the FLSA puts on the amount of com-
pensatory hours that an employee can accumulate is an effort to guarantee that
employees only accumulate amounts of compensatory time that they can reasona-
245. Id. at 1660.
246. Id. (Citing to 29 U.S.C. § 207 (a)(1) (1994).
247. Id. (Citing to 29 U.S.C. § 207 (o)(5) (1994).
248. Id.
249. Christiansen, 120 S. Ct. at 1657.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 1660.
253. Id. at 1662.
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bly use. Since the employer is free to cash out an employee's compensatory
time, or to simply pay employees for the overtime hours they work, the cap is not
meant as an aid to the employer. 5 The cap is an effort to ensure that the em-
ployee has some input as to when to use accumulated time. The Court asserted
that if the employees prevailed, they would be able to use the FLSA as a sword
rather than as a shield; they would be able to force employers to pay cash compen-
sation, rather than providing compensatory time to employees who work over-
time. 6
In arriving at the conclusion that §207(o)(5) of the FLSA does not prohibit
employers from forcing employees to use compensatory time, the Court pointed
to two provisions of the FLSA 7 First, under the FLSA, employers are free to
decrease the number of hours that an employee works. The Court cited precedent
that an employer was free to tell an employee to take off for an afternoon, a day,
or even a week. 8 Second, an employer is allowed to cash out accumulated com-
pensatory time by paying the employee the wage for each hour accrued25 9 The
Court reasoned that, under the FLSA, an employer is able to force an employee to
take off, and an employer is also able to use the money that would have been paid
in wages to cash out accumulated compensatory time.!6 By compelling an em-
ployee to take compensatory time, the employer was merely combining the two
steps. Since each step independently is lawful, the Court reasoned that the two
step procedure is also lawful.261
The Court focused on what they mistakenly saw as the crux of the employ-
ees' argument: express unius est exclusio alterius.262 The Court thus framed the
underlying question: who decides how an employee's wages are to be spent? The
District Court decided this issue alone, holding that forced usage policies deprive
employees of their property. 263 The Supreme Court rejected this assumption, and,
in doing so, stripped employees of control over how and when their property
wages will be used.
Aside from questions of equity, the Court's opinion ignores the main thrust
of the employees' argument: while the FLSA does not prohibit compelled usage
policies, such policies are enforceable only in the light of an agreement between
the parties.264 This does not "nullify" the compensatory time exception by requir-
ing employers to pay cash, as the Court majority contends; it simply forces the par-
265ties to abide by their voluntary, contractual agreements.
254. Id.
255. Christiansen, 120 S. Ct. at 1662.
256. Id. at 1661.
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The dissent maintained that by permitting compelled usage to reduce ac-
crued compensatory time, the Court set back the labor movement to an era when
"company scrip" compensation schemes decided when, where and how an em-
266ployee could receive and spend earned compensation. It is also noteworthy, as
the dissent points out, that this is exactly the view espoused by the United States
Department of Labor in both the letter to Harris County and in the Department's
amicus brief filed on behalf of the employees.267 Such an authoritative opinion is
normally accorded wide latitude by the judiciary. However, the Court circum-
vented this issue, holding that the opinion letter and the amicus brief, which the
Court makes slight mention of, are entitled only minimal deference.26
The public sector employees who, in good faith, accepted compensatory time
in lieu of cash, safely accruing it for the family summer vacation, now has the
terms of its use dictated by the employer. The public sector rank-and-file employ-
ees are the obvious losers as the Court deferred to the government institutional
employers.
The Supreme Court ruled that there is nothing in the text of the FLSA or
regulations that prohibits an employer from compelling usage. The opinion essen-
tially concludes that the statute is silent, and thus does not exclude the possibility
of a future amendment prohibiting such policies absent an agreement,26 9 As indi-
cated by its amicus brief, the Department of Labor is sympathetic to the plight of
the employees and may fashion an administrative regulation that supercedes and
repudiates this decision.27o
H. TERM 2000: SoME PRELIMINARY FORECASTS
A. Circuit City Stores v. Adams
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the Federal Arbi-
tration Act does not apply to employment contracts.271 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari on May 22, 2000, with oral arguments scheduled for the Octo-
ber, 2000 Term.272 The FAA's (non) applicability in the employment context has
been one of the most intricate and vexing issues in employment law for decades.
In Circuit City Stores, Saint Clair Adams signed an arbitration agreement as
a condition precedent to employment with Circuit City Stores, agreeing to settle
all disputes arising out of his employment by arbitration. 273 Shortly following his
departure from Circuit City one year later, Adams brought suit against his em-
ployer in state court alleging discrimination and harassment.
266. Id. at 1666.




271. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 194 F.3d 1070, 1071 (9th Cir. 1999).
272. Id. at 1070.
273. Id. at 1071.
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Circuit City sought an order in federal district court staying the state court
proceeding and compelling arbitration pursuant to the arbitration agreement.Z74
Adams argued that the agreement was an unconscionable, unenforceable contract
of adhesion.
275
The District Court for the Northern District of California ruled the agree-
ment legally enforceable, and ordered arbitration to resolve the dispute.2 76 The
Ninth Circuit reversed, holding the agreement an employment contract and there-
fore beyond the FAA's coverage.277
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, limiting review to whether the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act applies to employment contracts, and whether the state re-
tains its right to regulate arbitration agreements.
Saint Clair Adams signed an arbitration contract as a condition precedent to
employment with Circuit City Stores.2 78 The dispute resolution agreement (DRA)
between the parties states that "all previously unasserted claims, disputes or con-
troversies arising out of or relating to my application or candidacy for employ-
ment, employment and/or cessation of employment with Circuit City, exclusively
by final and binding arbitration before a neutral arbitrator."279
The District Court addressed the issue of jurisdiction. The Court acknowl-
edged that section 4 of the FAA gives federal courts the power to compel arbitra-
tion, but only where the court has some independent basis for subject matter ju-
risdiction.m Applying this principle, the Court found jurisdiction based on the
diversity of the parties to the action. 1
Having established authority to hear the case, the Court turned to the merits.
The Court rejected Adam's assertion that the agreement constituted an uncon-
scionable contract of adhesion. While the agreement did contain some language
limiting the recovery available to Adams, it did not rise to "the extreme one-
sidedness required for a finding of unconscionability as a matter of law." There-
fore, the DRA was legally enforceable.
The agreement provided for arbitration in the event of any dispute arising
out of Adam's employment with Circuit City.m Since Adams alleged discrimina-
tion in employment, the Court ruled the proper forum to resolve the dispute is ar-
bitration. Pursuant to its power under the FAA, the Court ordered the parties
into arbitration. The Court made no mention of the applicability of the FAA to
employment contracts.










283. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 194 F.3d at 1071.
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Circuit reviewed de novo.2 As a threshold matter, the Court of Appeals ad-
dressed the district court's authority under the FAA to compel arbitration."5 The
FAA is a federal body of substantive law regulating the duty to arbitrate; it is not
a jurisdictional statute.2 6 Therefore, any party bringing suit must establish an in-
dependent source of federal jurisdiction.? The Court did not need to reach this
issue, because the FAA does not bestow upon the federal judiciary the authority
to enforce an employment contract.28s
The Ninth Circuit defined an 'employment contract' as "an agreement set-
ting forth 'terms and conditions' of employment." 289 The Court ruled that the
DRA constituted a 'condition of employment', despite some contract language to
the contrary.290 While the DRA did not alter Adam's status as an at-will em-
ployee, Circuit City would not hire him without one.29' Thus, the DRA consti-
tuted a condition precedent to employment, and, therefore, a condition of em-
ployment.292 The Court held the FAA does not apply to employment contracts,
and the district court was therefore without authority to compel arbitration. The
Court ordered the case dismissed for lack of federal authority.293
The proliferation of arbitration employment agreements over the last decade
has emboldened employers to push the limits. Have employers "killed the golden
goose" of arbitration? Arbitration clauses, such as the one used by Circuit City,
have become standard terms of employment, in a concentrated employer effort to
avoid the skyrocketing cost of litigation. Many such agreements are not the result
of a full 'meeting of the minds' between employer and employee. When employ-
ers dictate ADR terms to the employee, lower courts have often refused to en-
dorse such ADR provisions, as violative of basic due process.2 94
B. Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of America
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court, holding that public policy
does not compel termination of an employee working in a safety sensitive posi-
tion, who twice failed random drug tests and yet was reinstated to work by a labor
295






289. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 194 F.3d at 1071. See also Modzelewski Resolution Trust Corp., 14 F.3d
1374, 1376 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 525 (6th ed. 1990)).
290. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 194 F.3d at 1071. (The D.R.A. states in relevant part, "I understand
that neither this Agreement nor the Dispute Resolution Rules and Procedures form a contract of em-
ployment between Circuit City and me").
291. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 194 F.3d at 1071.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 1072.
294. Hooters of America, Inc., v. Philips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999).
295. Eastern Assoc. Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of America, 188 F.3d 501 (4th Cir. 1999).
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Mobile Equipment Operator ("MEG"). 2 6 His position required him to operate
heavy machinery, which ranged in weight from 32,000 to 55,000 pounds. A con-
dition of Smith's employment was the maintenance of a commercial driver's li-
cense, for which federal regulations mandate random drug testing.298 In 1996,
Smith tested positive for marijuana and his position with Eastern was terminated
shortly thereafter. The United Mine Workers of America filed a grievance on his
behalf challenging his termination, and taking the dispute to arbitration.29
At arbitration, Eastern argued that it had 'just cause' to discharge Smith, the
standard for termination under the collective bargaining agreement. 300 Eastern
pointed out that Smith had twice failed drug tests within 13 months, and therefore
constituted a significant safety hazard to himself and others.301 To support the dis-
charge, Eastern relied upon their zero tolerance substance abuse policy, which re-
quired that an employee who tests positive be "removed from any safety-sensitive
position and subject to disciplinary action up to and including termination."3°2
The union argued that, apart from these two instances, Smith's 17-year em-
30ployment record with Eastern was impeccable.03 Smith testified that his drug use
was recreational, and was triggered by an isolated family problem.3°
Arbitrator Jerome Barrett concluded that while Eastern's safety concerns
were legitimate, Smith's actions did not give Eastern 'just cause" for termination
and ordered Smith reinstated, following an unpaid disciplinary suspension period
of 75 days.305 As a condition of judgment, Smith was required to provide Eastern
with a signed, undated resignation letter, which would be rendered legal and bind-
ing if he tested positive for drug use within a 5-year period following reinstate-
ment.3°
Eastern filed suit in federal district court seeking to vacate the arbitrator's
decision.30 7 The District Court affirmed the arbitrator's decision, holding that the
arbitrator did not exceed the scope of his authority, and that public policy does
not compel termination of an employee with a history of drug use who works in a
safety sensitive position.08
The Court rejected Eastern's contention that the arbitrator exceeded the
scope of his authority by not upholding the discharge in light of the strict policy on
drug use.09 The Court began by reiterating the judicial standard for reviewing an




300. Id. at 799.
301. Eastern Assoc Coal Corp., 66 F. Supp. 2d at 799.
302. Id. at 798.
303. See id. at 799.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 800.
306. See id.
307. Eastern Assoc Coal Corp., 66 F. Supp. 2d at 800.
308. See id. at 796.
309. Id. at 802.
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arbitrator's decision: "As long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or ap-
plying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority, that a court is con-
vinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision."31
Nevertheless, an arbitrator's power is limited, as an "award must draw its essence
from the contract and cannot simply reflect the arbitrator's own notions of indus-
trial justice., 311 In seeking to resolve a dispute, the arbitrator can look to work
rules and disciplinary enforcement policies and practices.31
Under the collective bargaining agreement between Eastern and its employ-
ees, Eastern could discharge any employee, qualified by the requirement that it be
for "just cause." As "just cause" was not further defined by the agreement, the
Court ruled the arbitrator was free to look to other sources for guidance, including
Eastern's substance abuse policy. 313 The Court noted that Eastern's policy called
for disciplinary measures "up to and including termination., 314 Therefore, the ar-
bitrator did not exceed his scope of authority, as a pertinent regulation permits
discipline short of discharge for employees who test positive for narcotics.
31 5
The Court also rejected Eastern's argument that public policy mandated dis-
charge under the circumstances. A Court must vacate an arbitrator's decision if it
contravenes a well defined and dominant public policy. 316 The Court cited numer-
ous policy sources against the performance of safety sensitive jobs by employees
impaired or under the influence, including Department of Transportation Regula-
tions ("DOT").317
The Court concluded, however, that Eastern failed to establish that the arbi-
trator's award contravened public policy. DOT regulations militate against drug
use while operating machinery, but there was no evidence that Smith ever en-
gaged in drug use at work. Therefore, the arbitrator's reinstatement of Smith did
not contravene a well defined and dominant public policy.
318
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court in an unpublished per curiam
opinion.319 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on March 20, 2000, and heard
oral arguments on October 28, 2000.320 The Court was deciding whether to reaf-
310. Id. (Quoting United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29,38, (1987)).
311. See id.
312. See id. at 801-02.
313. Eastern Assoc. Coal Corp., 66 F. Supp. 2d at 802.
314. See id.
315. Id. at 802-03.
316. See id. at 803.
317. The department of transportation represented that it was a federal regulation that mandated
random drug testing in the first place.
318. The Court acknowledged two decisions, Exxon Corp. v. Esso Worker's Union, Inc., 118 F.3d 841
(1st Cir. 1997), and Etron Corp. v. Baton Rouge Oil and Chem. Workers Union, 77 F.3d 850 (5th Cir.
1996), that buttress Eastern's position that public policy requires termination where an employee tests
positive for drugs. While the Court could have focused on these two cases as expanding the scope of
public policy, they ultimately chose to ground their decision in DOT regulations, which make no refer-
ence to such a policy. See Eastern Associated Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 66 F. Supp. 2d 796 at
804 (S.D.W.Va. 1998).
319. Eastern Associated Coal Company v. United Mine Workers of America, 188 F.3d 501 (4th Cir.
1999).
320. Eastern Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of America, 121 S. Ct. 426 (2000).
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firm or modify its Misco precedent? 21
In 1991, a subway train in New York City derailed; five people died in the af-
termath, with 200 injured. Crack vials were later found in the cab of the train. The
Exxon Valdez foundered off the coast of Alaska, spilling millions of gallons of
crude oil and threatening an entire ecosystem. The captain of the ship was under
the influence of alcohol. These tragedies, Eastern argues, could have been pre-
vented, had those employers taken affirmative steps to remove employees with a
history of drug abuse from safety sensitive positions.
Much speculation arose regarding the continuing validity of the standard for
setting aside an arbitrator's award, as announced in Misco, when the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to review the Fourth Circuit's decision in Eastern Coal
Corp. On its face, Eastern Coal was a relatively typical and ordinary situation
where an arbitrator, in construing a collectively bargained for "just cause" dis-
charge provision, repudiated an employer's decision to fire an employee for a sec-
ond violation of the substance abuse policy, and ordered the employer to reinstate
him, provided that certain conditions were met. The apparent normality of the
situation presented in Eastern Coal suggested that perhaps the Court was ready to
announce a new standard, one that would subject an arbitrator's award to a more
stringent and search level of judicial scrutiny.
This case, however, transcends a mere litmus test of the Court's political cli-
mate. The implications are very significant. As the opinions of both the District
and Circuit Court acknowledge, there is strong public policy against the use of
drugs on the job, especially in safety sensitive positions. This view is essentially
undisputed.322 This case presents a novel issue: whether public policy compels
termination when an employee who uses drugs during non-work hours tests posi-
tive for narcotics. 323 Essentially, Eastern is seeking a policy that compels termina-
tion where an employee has the potential to engage in drug use on the job. It thus
partially transcends Misco.
324
Tremendous judicial deference has been granted to arbitrators' findings.
Subsequently, the Court in Misco announced that "[a]n arbitrator's award must
draw its essence from the contract and cannot reflect the arbitrator's own notions
of industrial justice.... But as long as [an honest] arbitrator is even arguably con-
struing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority, [a
finding by a court that he] committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his
decision." 3
321. United Paperworks Int'l. Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29,36 (1987).
322. It is outlined in numerous decisions and Department of Transportation Regulations, see, 49
CER. Section 382.101 (1998); see also, Gulf Coast Indus. Workers Union v. Exxon Corp., 991 F.2d 244
(5th Cir. 1993); Erron Corp. v. Baton Rouge Oil and Chem. Workers Union, 77 F.3d 850 (5th Cir.
1996); Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 861 F.2d 665 (11th Cir. 1988).
323. Mary Bernstein, Director of the Office of Drug and Alcohol Policy Compliance in the Depart-
ment of Transportation, stated that the regulations promulgated by the DOT are "deliberately silent"
on the issue of reinstatement. Jennifer Skalka, Drug-Involved Workplaces: The Policy Debate, Medill
News Service (visited July 28,2000) <http://www.medill.nwu.edu/docket/99-1038amicus.html>
324. United Paperworks Int'l. Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29,36 (1987).
325. See id. at 36-37.
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The Supreme Court framed the issue as whether "the agreement to reinstate
Smith with specified conditions runs contrary to an explicit, well-defined, and
dominant public policy, as ascertained by reference to positive law and not from
general considerations of supposed public interests. 3 26 By placing the "positive
law" qualification on the exception, the Court sharply narrowed the exception's
application and further solidified Misco as the governing standard of virtually ab-
solute judicial deference to arbitrators' awards. The Court stated that its authority
to invoke the public policy exception is not limited solely to instances where the
arbitration award itself violates positive law.3z  In applying the standard, the
Court found the arbitrator's award violated no specific provision of any laws, and
that it was totally consistent with the federal Department of Transportation's
regulations for allowing a person who tests positive for drugs to return to work. 32
While not expressly stated, it is clear that Misco is alive and well.
C. Garrett v. University of Alabama at Birmingham Board of Trustees
Garrett presents the Court with the challenge, and the opportunity, to extend
further the Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence of states' rights and sovereignty
so manifestly ascendant in Kimel, in further derogation of public sector workers'
employment rights to be free from discrimination on the basis of disability.329
The Eleventh Circuit held that the state is not immune from suit under the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and the Rehabilitation Act.30 The de-
cision of the district court granting summary judgment for the state as defendant
employer was reversed.
In Garrett, the Eleventh Circuit decided that Congress unequivocally ex-
pressed the intent to abrogate sovereign immunity granted to the states by the
Eleventh Amendment, and that the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act were, there-
fore, valid exercises of the Enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.331
The Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), which sets standards for situations in
which employers must grant leave for employees who care for oneself or a family
member with a serious health problem, is also at issue.
The FMLA sets national minimum standards for family and medical leave in
employment, requiring that covered employers provide twelve weeks of unpaid
leave per year.332 An employer is prohibited from inhibiting an employee from
exercising FMLA rights or retaliating for doing so.
326. Eastern Coal Corp., 121 S. Ct. 426 (2000).
327. Id.
32& Id.
329. Garrett v. University of Alabama at Birmingham Board of Trustees, 193 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir.
1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 901 (1999).
330. The Third Circuit, however, has more recently held that Congress lacked the power to abrogate
the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity when it enacted the ADA. Consequently, Pennsylvania is
immune from a state employee's ADA lawsuit in federal court. Lavia v. Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections, 224 F.3d. 190 (3d Cir. 2000)
331. Garrett v. University of Alabama at Birmingham Bd. Of Trustees, 193 F.3d 1214, 1216 (11th
Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 1669 (U.S. 2000).
332. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a) (1994).
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The FMLA's remedial measures combat sex and disability discrimination in
employment, and applies to firms employing fifty or more employees who have
worked for the employer one year or more. The FMLA guarantees only unpaid
leave.
The FMLA contains a provision including state employees within its cover-
age.333 In order to lessen the burden on the states, Congress took the initiative to
exclude from its coverage state employees who hold high-ranking, sensitive posi-
tions.334
D. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the dis-
trict court of Oregon, which ordered the PGA to make an exception to its "walk-
ing rule" to allow Martin to ride a golf cart during PGA competitions pursuant to
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).335 The Court found that golf courses
are places of public accommodation and the use of the cart does not "fundamen-
tally alter" the nature of the game.
336
Casey Martin suffers from a congenital, degenerative circulatory disorder
that is manifested in a malformation of his right leg.337 This disorder causes Mar-
tin severe pain and atrophy in his lower leg, rendering him unable to walk for ex-
tended periods of time.33s If he is to pursue his chosen employment as a profes-
sional golfer, he contends that he needs the cart to move about the golf course
during the game.
The PGA sponsors three competitive tours: the PGA, the Buy.Com Tour
(formerly the Nike Tour), and the Senior PGA Tour.339 On days of the tourna-
ments, PGA is the operator of the golf course. 34° In order to gain entry to the
PGA Tour and Nike Tour, competitors must have the best scores in qualifying
school. There are three qualifying stages, the first two of which permit players to
utilize golf carts, and in the third stage, players are expected to walk the course as
they play without any use of golf carts to transport them.341 After qualifying for
the third and final stage of the 1997 qualifying school, Martin requested permis-
sion of the PGA to use a golf cart.342 The PGA denied his request; Martin sued.343
The district court granted him a preliminary injunction, and while using a
golf cart, Martin qualified to earn a spot on the 1998 Nike Tour.3 Martin was
333. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2617(a)(1)(A), (a)(2) (1994).
334. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611(3), 203(e)(2)(C) (1994).
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subsequently granted partial summary judgment by the court, holding that the
PGA is subject to Title III of the ADA because it owns, operates, and leases golf
courses, which the ADA identifies as public places of accommodation. 345 The dis-
trict court also ruled that the PGA is not exempt from the ADA as a private club,
because it is a commercial enterprise offering athletic events to the public
4 6
As a matter of law, Title III of the ADA applies to the PGA and Nike Tour
competitions. The anti-discrimination statute of the ADA provides:
No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full en-
joyment of the goods, services, facilities, advantages, or accommodations of any
place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or
operates a place of public accommodation.
347
For purposes of this subchapter, a golf course is considered a public place of ac-
commodationY8
The PGA contends that the area "behind the ropes" is not open to the pub-
lic (spectators); because they have no right to enter it, the course is therefore not a
place of public accommodation.349 The court rejected this argument. The statute
also defines "public accommodation" to include "place of exercise or recrea-
tion."350 The PGA argued that the competitors are not there to exercise, but to try
to win money, and the statute therefore should not apply.3 1 However, the court
pointed out the statue still applies because the golf course is a "place of exhibition
or entertainment.
3 52
The Court of Appeals analogized to a case from the Third Circuit, Menko-
witz v. Pottstown Memorial Medical Center.353 A physician with a disability sued a
hospital, after it denied him hospital staff privileges.354 The court in the Menko-
witz case rejected the idea that Title III could only be invoked by patients of hos-
pitals.355 Denial of staff access constitutes a denial of "full and equal enjoyment of
the goods, services, facilities... or accommodations of any place of public ac-
commodations" prohibited by Title 111?56
The PGA contends that it may compartmentalize golf courses during compe-
titions, just as a large hotel with a separate residential wing.357 The non-residential
area would not be a place of public accommodation. The court responded by
recognizing that the residential wing never functioned as a hotel, whereas a golf
345. Id.
346. Id. at 997.
347. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
348. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(L).
349. Martin, 204 F.3d at 996.
350. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(L).
351. Martin, 204 F.3d at 996.
352. Id.
353. 154 F.3d 113 (3d Cir. 1998).
354. Id.
355. See id.
356. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
357. Martin, 204 F.3d at 996.
358. Id. (Citing 28 C.F.R. ch. 1, pt. 36, app. B at 623 (1999)).
36
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 36 [2000], Iss. 3, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol36/iss3/1
SUPREME COURT'S LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
course during a tournament can only serve as a golf course.359 The PGA is assum-
ing there is nothing public about the competition itself.36° According to the PGA,
the fact that its tournaments are limited to the best golfers means that the courses
on which they play cannot be places of public accommodation. 361 Title III does
not restrict its coverage to members of the public; it provides that "No individual
shall be discriminated against" in the enjoyment of public accommodations by
reason of disability.362
The golf course is a place of public accommodation. The winnowing process
of competition by the sport's best should not so restrict competition as to deprive
the golf courses' status as places of public accommodation. The court did not
draw an artificial line between use of a public accommodation for pleasure, and
use in the pursuit of a living.
363
The second issue addressed by the court was whether permitting Martin to
use a golf cart will "fundamentally alter" the nature of the goods or services - in
this case, the PGA or Nike tour.364 Title III of the ADA further defines discrimi-
nation as:
A failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures,
when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privi-
leges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the en-
tity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the
nature of such goods, services, privileges, advantages or accommodations. 65
Permitting Martin to use a golf cart solved Martin's problem of access to the
competition. It is not a difficult practical matter to permit the use of carts, since
the district court found that golf carts are used in other competitions?.
66
Permitting Martin to use a golf cart will not fundamentally alter the nature
of the game. Walking is not essential to the game of golf. 367 In the rules promul-
gated by the United States Golf Association and the Royal and Ancient Golf Club
of St. Andrews, the game of golf consists of playing ball from the teeing ground
into the hole by a stroke or successive stroke in accordance with the Rules.
369
These rules do not require a player to walk.369 The PGA does not require players
to walk in the early stages of the qualifying school or the Senior Tour
370
The PGA does make provisions for a player to ride the cart during the game
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igain.37' The district court found the purpose of making the players walk injected
a fatigue factor, but this is not significant since there are low levels of exercise dur-
ing the competition.372 A waiver for one player would apply to all. A waiver to
Martin would not fundamentally alter the PGA and Nike Tour competitions.373
The district court noted that, if given the choice, a large number of players chose
to walk; the use of a cart assigns no handicap penalty to those who ride as opposed
to those who walk.374
The district court also evaluated whether Martin would be advantaged over
the other competitors.375 Even with the use of a cart, Martin must walk about
twenty five percent of the course, because the cart cannot be brought near the ball
in many situations.376 The district court found that since Martin experiences sig-
nificant pain while walking and getting in and out of the cart, he easily endures
greater fatigue even with a cart than his able-bodied competitors do by walking? 7
The court of appeals concluded, as did the district court, that the central competi-
tion in shot-making would be unaffected by accommodation of Martin.3 78
The PGA argues permitting a player to ride a cart fundamentally distorts the
competition, and that the inquiry should summarily end there.379 The statute,
however, mandates an inquiry into whether a particular exception to a rule would
"fundamentally alter" the nature of the good or service being offered.3S 0 The evi-
dence must "focus on the specifics of the plaintiff's or defendant's circumstances
and not on the general nature of the accommodation., 381 This is an intensive fact-
based inquiry. The outcome would be different, the court notes, if Martin was re-
questing to use a special golf ball that carries further, or seeking to play a shorter
course than his competitors. Martin, however, seeks only to use a cart between
shots.m The district court found that this accommodation does not fundamentally
alter the competition? 3
The Court of Appeals concluded that, under Title III of the ADA, a golf
course is a place of public accommodation when the PGA is conducting a tourna-
ment.? The district court granted Martin the use of a cart as a reasonable ac-
commodation to his disability holding that such use of a cart does not fundamen-
tally alter the nature of the PGA and Nike Tour tournaments.' 5








379. Id. at 1001.
380. Id.
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E. Kentucky River Community Care, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board
Kentucky River Community Care, Inc. (KRCC), a mental health and retar-
dation service provider, seeks to avoid union representation of its work force,
based on the argument that it is a political subdivision and therefore not an em-
ployer subject to the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).386 In the alternative,
it argues that even if it is an employer for purposes of the NLRA, its registered
nurses and rehabilitation counselors are "supervisors" and therefore exempt from
the collective bargaining unit.3l
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that KRCC is not a "political
subdivision" within the meaning of the NLRA, that registered nurses are supervi-
sors within the meaning of the NLRA, and that the rehabilitation counselors are
not supervisors within the meaning of the NLRA.2
The court first dealt with the issue whether KRCC is a political subdivi-
sion.3s9 KRCC claims that the NLRB incorrectly applied the test articulated in
NLRB v. National Gas Util. Dist., 3 owhen it decided that KRCC was not created
as an arm of the state, and that KRCC was not administered by individuals who
are responsible to public officials or the general electorate.39 1 To satisfy the first
prong of the Natural Gas test, KRCC must show that it was created directly by the
state, and that the state intended KRCC to operate as an arm of the govern-
ment. 2 The Court of Appeals was satisfied that KRCC was not formed directly
by the state because, in part, KRCC is a private, nonprofit corporation, operating
mental health and retardation contracts pursuant to contracts. 3
The alternative analysis articulated in Natural Gas determines whether
KRCC is administered by individuals who are responsible to public officials or to
the general electorate.394 KRCC argues that because the Secretary for Human
Resources has significant control over KRCC's operations, KRCC is an organiza-
tion run by individuals responsible to public officials.395 The court pointed out that
it does not necessarily follow that such oversight means that the individuals in
charge at KRCC are responsible to public officials. 6 Contrary to KRCC's asser-
tions, neither any Kentucky public official nor the general public control the com-
position of KRCC's board of directors.37 KRCC complies with the state law re-
quiring the board to be representative of the community served, but this is only




390. 402 U.S. 600, 604-05 (1971).




395. Id. at 451.
396. Id.
397. Kentucky River Community Care, 193 F.3d 451.
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because KRCC seeks to operate as a local mental health retardation board.398
KRCC maintains that even if it is an employer subject to the NLRA, the reg-
istered nurses and rehabilitation counselors it employs are supervisors and there-
fore exempt from the collective bargaining unit under 29 U.S.C. § 152(11). 3 9 The
NLRA applies only to employees.4° Individuals who are employed as supervisors
are specifically excluded from the definition of "employee."' The NLRA defines
"supervisor" as any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer to
hire, transfer, suspend... requires the use of "independent judgment. ' 4D2
The court acknowledged that whether an employee is a supervisor is a highly
fact intensive inquiry and therefore must be scrutinized carefully.403 During two-
thirds of the day at Caney Creek, the nurses act as building supervisors.404 Nurses
are authorized to shift staff between units, and to write up those who do not com-
ply immediately.4 The nurses have the authority to call employees into work
early, or ask employees to remain on duty.406 The registered nurses are also re-
sponsible for ensuring that licensed practical nurses properly dispense patient
medications. 4°7 After ascertaining the scope of the responsibilities nurses have,
the court decided these responsibilities did not call for the exercise of "independ-
ent judgment" under NLRA § 152(11).
The NLRB's interpretation of "independent judgment" differs from that of
the court of appeals.4°s The NLRB says that the practice of a nurse supervising a
nurse's aide in administering patient care does not involve the use of independent
judgment.4' The NLRB classifies these activities as routine; nurses have the abil-
ity to direct patient care because of their training and expertise, not because of
41their connection with management. 10 The Court of Appeals has repeatedly re-jected this interpretation, and has instead found that nurses are supervisors when
they direct assistants with respect to patient care, rectify staffing shortages, fill out
evaluation forms, and serve as the highest ranking employee in the building during
off-peak shifts.
411
In Mid-America Care, the Sixth Circuit reversed the NLRB's conclusion that
412
nurses are not supervisors. The Sixth Circuit stated that it, not the NLRB, is the
ultimate interpreter of this statutory provision, and that the NLRB's narrow defi-
398. Id.
399. Id. at 452.
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. Id. (Citing 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1994)).
403. Kentucky River Community Care, 193 F.3d at 452.
404. Id.




409. Kentucky River Community Care, 193 F.3d at 453.
410. Id.
411. Id. (Citing Mid-America Care v. NLRB, 148 F.3d 638,641 (6th Cir. 1998)).
412 Mid-America Care, 148 F.3d at 642.
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nition of the term "independent judgment" was rejected.4 13 However, in Mid-
America Care, the court concluded that the Caney Creek nurses were supervisors,
and thus rejected the NLRB's decision to include them in the bargaining unit.414
The last major issue the court of appeals addressed was whether rehabilita-
tion counselors at Caney Creek are "supervisors."415 Rehabilitation counselors do
not have any hiring or scheduling responsibilities.4 16 In order to qualify as supervi-
sors, they are evaluated according to the same standards as the registered
nurses.417 The rehabilitation counselors must have the authority to engage in one
of the activities enumerated in NLRA § 152(11), using independent judgment in
the interest of the employer.4 8
At KRCC, the primary function of the rehabilitation counselors is to design
a patient treatment plan.419 This does not, in itself, involve any supervisory
authority.4 0 The fact that the assistants carry out the provisions of the treatment
plans designed by the counselors does not suggest that the counselors are supervi-
sors.421 The court of appeals held that substantial evidence supports the NLRB's
decision that rehabilitation counselors are not supervisors, and were therefore
properly included in the bargaining unit
42
CONCLUSION
By any measure, the Court's labor and employment law jurisprudence has
shifted dramatically over the decades.423 Conventional labor-management rela-
tions law, which was the dominant, if not exclusive, focus of the Court's labor and
employment law jurisprudence until a quarter century ago, is now an important,
but no longer controlling part of the jurisprudential fabric. During the 1999 and
2000 Terms employment discrimination law surged. The trend towards Alterative
Dispute Resolution ("ADR") continues to accelerate. It is in the ADR arena
where labor-management relations are an important part of the larger picture.
Unlike many Terms over the course of the past several decades, the surge in fed-
eralism decisions during the past decade is now increasingly implicating the states
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. Kentucky River Community Care, 193 F.3d at 454.
416. Id. at 455.
417. Id.
418. Id. (Citing Grancare, Inc. v. NLRB, 137 F.3d 372,375 (6th Cir. 1998)).
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. Kentucky River Community Care, 193 F.3d at 455.
422. Id.
423. Commentators have consistently charted the greater heterogeneity induced by employment dis-
crimination, pension and benefit, and non-union employment law, far beyond the borders of conven-
tional labor management relations law. See Benjamin, Aaron, Half-Century of Labor Relations Law
and Collective Bargaining, 13 THE LABOR LAWYER. 551 (1998); Michael H. Gottesman, Union Sum-
mer: A Reawakened Interest in the Law of Labor?, 1996 Sup. Cr. REv. 285 (1996); Thomas C., Kohler,
The Employment Relation and Its Ordering at Century's End: Reflections on Emerging Trends in the
United States, 41 B.C. L. REv. 103 (1999); W. Gary Vause, Labor Law Symposium: Symposium Over-
view - 1994 Critical issues in Labor and Employment Law, 24 STETSON L. REv. 1 (1994).
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as employers. More precisely, the renaissance in states' rights is exempting states
from liability for violating federal labor and employment laws, vitiating the power
of the federal Congress to subject the states to federal laws in light of the Eleventh
Amendment.
Within this broad framework of increasing emphasis on ADR and on the
panoply of non-union employment law issues, there is little likelihood of the Court
being presented with (re)examination of fundamental principles at the heart of la-
bor and employment law. Rather, the Court seems to continue to be occupied
with increasingly technical and intricate, indeed, almost Byzantine, parsing of la-
bor and employment law statutes. As the national demographics inexorably re-
flect the graying of the baby boom into the first wave of retirement, there is one
certainty for the Court's labor and employment law jurisprudence over the course
of the next few decades. The Court will be faced with an intricate, and critically
important, series of legal issues implicating retirement security. If the Court em-
braces ADR trends with any degree of enthusiasm, the bulk of non-pension labor
and employment law disputes will be moving toward those ADR venues for pri-
vate resolution, rather than to the courts. Consequently, within the next several
years, apart from retirement security decisions, labor and employment law deci-
sions will probably only rarely and sporadically be part the Court's broader juris-
prudence. Depending on the course of its ADR decisions in the next several
Terms, the bulk of labor and employment law disputes may be, for all practical
purposes, departing the federal judicial arena for the myriad of ADR venues.
Herdrich and Salomon Smith Barney may well auger the future.
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